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SENTENCING IN GERMANY:
EXPLAINING LONG-TERM STABILITY
IN THE STRUCTURE OF CRIMINAL
SANCTIONS AND SENTENCING
HANS-JÖRG ALBRECHT*
I
INTRODUCTION
In the last decades, much has been written on significant changes in the use
of prison sentences and imprisonment. These changes are assumed to reflect
growing punitiveness and a rapidly spreading demand for public protection
through long periods of confinement. In particular, the heavy inflation of the
U.S. prison population has triggered scholarly attempts to explain an apparently
1
insatiable appetite for imprisonment. Only marginal attention has been paid to
the question of why consistency in sentencing, stability in sentencing outcomes,
and a modest use of imprisonment can be observed in certain countries more
than in others. For example, remarkable stability in the structure of criminal
sanctions has been on display in Germany since the end of the 1960s, when a
major law amendment gave priority to fines and significantly restricted the use
of prison sentences. Since the end of the 1960s, now a period of four decades,
four out of five criminal sanctions imposed by German criminal courts are day
2
fines. Although some variation in rates of imprisonment can be observed over
the last forty years in Germany, upward and downward swings have been
limited. Criminal court statistics also show that the bulk of criminal sentences
fall in the lower third of the range of sentences carried by criminal offense
statutes. In spite of a statutory framework of sentencing that does not provide
effective guidance for judges, consistency and stability are evidently achieved
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1. NILS CHRISTIE, CRIME CONTROL AS INDUSTRY: TOWARDS GULAGS, WESTERN STYLE (3d
ed. 2000); DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY (2001); LOIS WACQUANT, PUNIR LES PAUVRES: LE NOUVEAU
GOUVERNEMENT DE L’INSECURITE SOCIALE (2004).
2. A day fine (also called unit fine) refers to a three-step procedure of determining a fine. In the
first step, the number of day fines (units) is fixed. The number of day fines shall reflect the seriousness
of the crime. In the second step, the size of a day fine is determined on the basis of the daily net income
of the defendant. In the third step, the size of the fine is calculated by multiplying the number of day
fines by the size of the day fine. Thus, day fines, unlike fixed-sum fines, may be adjusted to the individual
financial circumstances of the offender and will satisfy the need for equal punishment.
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through channels other than authoritative sentencing guidelines. At first glance,
it seems that significant restraints are at work in the sentencing process that
prevent the use of protracted prison sentences as a punitive and deterrent
response, and those restraints are unaffected by the rhetoric of German
politicians—like that of their peers elsewhere—in favor of punitive responses to
3
crime.
A first clue in the analysis of what might serve as a restraint can be found in
discourses originating in German politics about broadening the range of
preventive detention (Sicherungsverwahrung) as a response to dangerous
4
offenders. Germany was on trial before the European Court of Human Rights
on several occasions over the last two years, facing allegations of violations of
Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights due to the
introduction of a retroactive security measure allowing indeterminate (and
possibly lifelong) preventive detention for offenders deemed dangerous
5
(particularly violent and sexual offenders). In the court hearings, the German
Federal Ministry of Justice presented an interesting argument to the European
Court. The Ministry of Justice lawyers argued that this type of security measure
(preventive detention for dangerous habitual offenders) was contributing to the
6
relatively low imprisonment rate observed in Germany. Elaborating along this
line of reasoning, Winfried Hassemer has argued that the advances in
sentencing doctrine and sentencing theory—as well as corresponding standards
of reasoning, transparency, and accountability imposed on trial courts by
appellate courts and the Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof)—have
resulted in concentrating the political pursuit of security on this “second track”
7
of criminal sanctions focused on preventive detention instead of personal guilt.
In fact, imprisonment rates have been on the decline in Germany for at least a
decade, and in some German states this decline is so marked that prison
capacity has had to be reduced significantly. The General Accounting Office of
the State of Hamburg recently advised the state government to respond to the
dramatic decline in the Hamburg prison population by adjusting the prison
8
budget and reducing the prison capacity accordingly.

3. Hans-Jörg Albrecht, Bestrafung der Armen? Zu Zusammenhängen zwischen Armut,
Kriminalität und Strafrechtsstaat, in GERECHTE AUSGRENZUNG? WOHLFAHRTSPRODUKTION UND
DIE NEUE LUST AM STRAFEN 111 (Bernd Dollinger & Henning Schmidt-Semisch eds., 2011).
4. For particulars, see infra notes 12–14 and accompanying text.
5. Haidn v. Germany, App. No. 6587/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2011); M. v. Germany, App. No.
19359/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010).
6. Heinz Schöch, Sicherungsverwahrung und Europäische Konvention zum Schutze der
Menschenrechte und Grundfreiheiten, in STRAFRECHT ALS SCIENTIA UNIVERSALIS; FESTSCHRIFT FÜR
CLAUS ROXIN ZUM 80 GEBURTSTAG AM 15 1193, 1203 (2011).
7. Winfried Hassemer, Sicherheit durch Strafrecht, 7 HRRS-STRAFRECHT 130, 141 (2006).
8. 3,120 prisoners in 2003; 2,030 in 2008; and 1,720 in 2011. See JANN MEYER-ABICH ET AL.,
JAHRESBERICHT 2009 ÜBER DIE PRÜFUNG DER HAUSHALTS- UND WIRTSCHAFTSFÜHRUNG DER
FREIEGIN UND HANSESTADT HAMBURG MIT BEMERKUNGEN ZUR HAUSHALTSRECHNUNG 2007, at
156 (Rechnungshof der Freien und Hansestadt Hamburg 2009).
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The argument brought forward in favor of preventive detention is based on
a logic of guilt-dependent criminal punishment, restricting not only the
imposition of a criminal sentence, but also the length of a prison sentence. A
system of sentencing strictly guided and limited by individual guilt—according
to this logic—prevents inflation of prison sentences by sidelining incapacitation
and the pursuit of security in the decision-making on criminal punishment in the
courts. With a separate track of measures of rehabilitation and security, the
German system of criminal sanctions provides for a narrow safety valve that
very selectively responds to political and public pressure for security and
deterrence.
II
AN OUTLINE OF SENTENCING AND CRIMINAL SANCTIONS IN GERMANY
Germany has adopted a two-track system of criminal sanctions: one track
for criminal punishment (which requires a finding of guilt and the
determination of a fine or a prison sentence) and another providing for so9
called measures for rehabilitation and protection of public security. These
second-track measures do not depend on personal responsibility; they are not
considered to carry blame. Instead, they are the consequence of a finding of
dangerousness (based on assessments of risks presented to the court by forensic
psychologists or psychiatrists) and a corresponding need for treatment or
preventive detention. This two-track approach is based on the belief that
proportional punishment limited by the principle of personal guilt may not be
sufficient to respond effectively (in terms of public protection) to habitual
offenders or offenders suffering from mental diseases or addictions to alcohol
or drugs who are likely to recidivate. German criminal law (as well the criminal
law of other continental European countries, such as Denmark, Austria, and
Switzerland) therefore provides for a line of criminal sanctions that pursues
prevention of serious recidivism alone. Measures of treatment and security
address three groups of criminal offenders deemed to be particularly at risk of
10
serious recidivism: the mentally ill, the addicted, and the habitual offender.
These groups figured prominently as early as in nineteenth century conceptions
11
In Germany, preventive detention
of crime and punishment.
(Sicherungsverwahrung) may be imposed in place of a prison sentence of two
years or more if—besides some formal conditions referring to prior
12
convictions—the status of a habitual felon and dangerousness are established.
Starting in 1998, a series of criminal law amendments driven by political

9. Hans-Jörg Albrecht, Security Gaps: Responding to Dangerous Sex Offenders in the Federal
Republic of Germany, 16 FED. SENT’G REP. 200, 200 (2004).
10. HEINZ KAMMEIER, MAßREGELRECHT (1995).
11. DEVIANCE ET SOCIETE, RISQUE, DANGEROSITE ET SECURITE: RENAISSANCE ET
MUTATIONS DE LA DEFENSE SOCIALE 34 (Christian N. Robert & Michel van de Kerchove eds., 2010).
12. STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] [CRIMINAL CODE], Nov. 13, 1998, BUNDESGESETZBLATT
[BGBL. I] 3322, § 66.
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concerns about dangerous sexual offenders widened the legal scope of the
13
preventive sentence significantly, making it applicable retroactively and
providing for the possibility of its imposition after a prison sentence has been
served. Retroactive application and post-enforcement sentence imposition
ultimately brought Germany before the European Court of Human Rights
(after the Federal Constitutional Court had turned down challenges by
detainees on the ground that the prohibition of retroactivity would apply to
14
criminal punishment only).
The system of sentencing and criminal sanctions implemented in Germany
15
includes substantive and procedural elements. The substantive elements are
found in the criminal penalties provided in the criminal code as well as their
minimum and maximum ranges, criminal offense statutes carrying each a
minimum and maximum penalty, and statutory prescriptions as regards the
choice between different criminal sanctions such as day fines and prison
sentences. The basic rule on sentencing mentions personal guilt as the decisive
factor in determining the sentence, but concedes that the impact of the sentence
16
on the offender should be taken into account. Moreover, a non-exhaustive list
of offense and offender-related elements must be considered when it comes to
17
determining the sentence. Beyond that, the sentencing rule says only that
characteristics that establish a criminal offense may not be used to justify a
18
particular sentence. The code gives explicit consideration to the victim and
victim–offender reconciliation, allowing for mitigation in cases of seriously
19
attempted or completely achieved reconciliation. Recently, a crown-witness
20
provision was introduced that provides for a sentencing discount, too.
21
Particular rules address sentencing of multiple offenses; they demand a
cumulative sentence (separate and consecutively enforceable sentences may not
22
be imposed) and result in mandatory sentencing discounts. In cases of
statutorily defined mitigating circumstances (most importantly, diminished
responsibility, participation in the form of aiding and abetting, and attempt),
23
minimum penalties are lowered significantly. A mandatory and general

13. For a summary of reforms, see Jörg Kinzig, Die Neuordnung des Rechts der
Sicherungsverwahrung, 4 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 177 (2011).
14. Grischa Merkel, Case Note, Retrospective Preventive Detention in Germany: A Comment on
the ECHR Decision Haidn v. Germany of 13 January 2011, 12 GERMAN L.J. 968 (2011).
15. Hans-Jörg Albrecht, SIMPLIFICATION OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE SETTLEMENTS OUT OF
COURT: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF EUROPEAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS, 20–23 (2001); HansJörg Albrecht, Sentencing and Punishment in Germany, in PENAL REFORM IN OVERCROWDED TIMES
139 (Michael Tonry ed., 2001).
16. STGB, Nov. 13, 1998, BGBL. I at 3322, § 46.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. § 46a.
20. Id. § 46b.
21. Id. §§ 52–55.
22. Id. § 54.
23. Id. § 49.
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statutory minimum for recidivists was abolished in 1986 (the minimum had
previously been raised to six months but was considered to have no practical
relevance), but recidivism as an aggravating factor was introduced specifically
24
for sexual abuse offenders in a 2003 criminal law amendment.
The procedural elements affecting sentencing refer to simplified criminal
proceedings that—if applied—severely restrict the range of penalties available
25
(day fines and suspended prison sentences up to one year may be imposed),
and to the recently introduced formal rules on sentence bargaining; further
26
procedural elements concern the duty to give detailed reasons in writing and
the rules that allow for a review of sentencing decisions by the High Court or
Federal Court of Justice. The duty to give detailed reasons in writing is
suspended if both prosecutor and defense waive the right to appeal, resulting in
27
the verdict becoming immediately final.
The German system of criminal sanction is simple and provides for only two
penal sanctions: day fines and imprisonment. Day fines come with a minimum
of five-day fines and a maximum of 360-day fines; prison sentences in general
may range from one month to fifteen years. The amount of a day fine unit
(reflecting the net income of the defendant) may range from €1 to €30,000. Life
imprisonment is almost exclusively restricted to murder, and the minimum
period to be served before a lifer may be paroled is set at fifteen years. Prison
sentences of up to two years may be suspended and conditions (fine,
compensation, or community service) may be attached. The choice between a
day fine and a short prison sentence (below six months) is strictly regulated
28
(after a major law reform in 1969), giving priority to day fines and imposing a
duty on courts to explain in writing why the priority rule should not apply. Most
criminal offense statutes do not prescribe a minimum sentence but define the
maximum penalty only. For offenses considered the most serious, minimum
penalties are statutorily defined, and the most common minimum penalty is
one-year imprisonment. However, for selected serious crimes (in particular,
aggravated robbery, rape, drug trafficking, and homicide) the minimum is
raised to two, three, or five years, and, in exceptional cases, to ten years. But
such increased minimums regularly come with a provision that reopens the
minimum and provides for a lesser minimum in cases of crimes of “less
seriousness” (“minder schwere Fälle”). In almost all of these cases, reduced
minimums result in the possibility of suspending a prison sentence. A full
criminal trial can be circumvented by resorting to simplified procedures and the

24. Hans-Jörg Albrecht, Sexualstrafrecht—Reformen und Ergebnisse, 59 RECHT DER JUGEND
148, 154 (2011).
25. STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG [STPO] [CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE], Apr. 7, 1987, BGBL. I
at 1074, § 407.
26. Id. § 267.
27. Id.
28. ERSTES GESETZ ZUR REFORM DES STRAFRECHTS (STRRG) [FIRST LAW AMENDING
CRIMINAL LAW], June 25, 1969, BGBL. I at 645.
UND DES BILDUNGSWESENS
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imposition of a penal order (Strafbefehl). A so-called penal order does not
require a trial, but restricts the sentence imposed in the penal order to a day
29
fine or a suspended sentence of imprisonment of a maximum of one year.
Summarizing some of the characteristics of the German system of
sentencing and sanctions that follow simply from substantive and procedural
rules and that are of relevance for the analysis of stability, we find:
(a) No effective statutory and mandatory minimums,
(b) Strict obligations to justify sentencing in detail and in writing,
(c) Incentives to resort to lower penalty ranges with provisions for
(i) Simplified proceedings, and
(ii) Reduced obligations to give reasons for sentencing,
(d) Strict limitation of prison sentences to a fifteen-year maximum,
(e) Multiple-offense sentencing statutes preventing separately enforceable sentences,
and
(f) A two-track system of criminal sanctions that separates preventive and retributive
functions.

III
CRIME, SENTENCING, AND STABILITY: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES
Over the last two decades, prisoner rates have increased significantly in
many European countries, and particularly in North America. When looking at
comparative prisoner rates in 2010 and 2011, Germany places in the bottom half
of European countries. When looking at the course of imprisonment rates from
various countries, Germany turns out to differ from a group of countries that
have exhibited, during the last two decades, extreme movements in prisoner
rates. The Netherlands, Spain, France, and especially England–Wales
experienced a long-term increase in imprisonment rates from the 1980s
30
forward. This rate increase resulted, for example, in a quadrupling of the
prison population in the Netherlands and unprecedented prisoner rates in
31
England–Wales and Spain. On the other hand, the Dutch prisons over the last
32
six years have been rapidly emptied, which resulted in the closing of prisons.
Other countries exhibited further growth (particularly France after President
33
Sarkozy put an end to the regular implementation of amnesties).
Michael Tonry has raised the question why—despite facing the same crime
problems and displaying the same punitive discourses in the political arena—

29. Hans-Jörg Albrecht, SIMPLIFICATION OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE SETTLEMENTS OUT OF
COURT: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF EUROPEAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS, 13–14 (2001).
30. World Prison Brief: Europe, INT’L CTR. FOR PRISON STUDIES, http://www.prisonstudies.org/
info/worldbrief/?search=europe&x=Europe (last visited Mar. 23, 2012),
31. Id.
32. ROB ALLEN, REDUCING THE USE OF IMPRISONMENT: WHAT CAN WE LEARN FROM
EUROPE? 5 (2012).
33. René Lévy, Pardons and Amnesties as Policy Instruments in Contemporary France, in CRIME,
PUNISHMENT, AND POLITICS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 551, 580–82 (Michael Tonry ed., 2007).
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German penal policies were not harsher and imprisonment rates higher. From
the course of German rates of imprisonment, on display in Graph 2, it seems
clear that the crime rate is not strongly correlated with prisoner rates
(exhibiting a Pearson correlation coefficient of -.054 in the observed data).
Crime evidently does not explain punishment, at least not to a substantial
extent and in its most serious form of imprisonment. In the 1960s and 1970s
imprisonment rates declined while crime rates increased significantly. From the
mid 1970s until the beginning of the 1980s a small window opens demonstrating
a parallel increase of crime rates and prisoner rates. In the 1980s until the
beginning of the 1990s imprisonment rates declined again while crime rates
continued to climb. From the mid 1990s until today the imprisonment rate
follows the crime rate in a remarkably stable and consistent way. Prisoner rates,
therefore, are driven by policy, sentencing, or both.
In contrast, England–Wales, the United States, Spain, and recently France
display a reverse pattern. Rates of imprisonment moved up despite a long-term
35
trend of declining crime rates (for the United States and England–Wales this is
36
accounted for in both police statistics and crime surveys). Stable rates of
Graph 1: Prisoner Rates in Europe and in the United States, 2010–2011 (Most Recent Figures).
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34. Michael Tonry, Why Aren’t German Penal Policies Harsher and Imprisonment Rates Higher?,
5 GERMAN L.J. 1187 (2004).
35. THE PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, PRISON COUNT 2010: STATE POPULATION DECLINES FOR
THE FIRST TIME IN 38 YEARS (2010); ROY WALMSLEY, WORLD PRISON POPULATION LIST (8th ed.
2009).
36. JENNIFER L. TRUMAN & MICHAEL R. RAND, NATIONAL CRIME VICTIMIZATION SURVEY:
CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION, 2009 (Georgette Walsh & Jill Duncan eds., 2010); CRIME IN ENGLAND
AND WALES 2010/11: FINDINGS FROM THE BRITISH CRIME SURVEY AND POLICE RECORDED CRIME
(Rupert Chaplin et al. eds., 2d ed. 2009); INT’L CTR. FOR PRISON STUDIES, supra note 30.
37. Source: INT’L CTR. FOR PRISON STUDIES, supra note 30.

09_ALBRECHT_BP (DO NOT DELETE)

218

3/19/2013 5:53 PM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 76:211

imprisonment are observed in most Scandinavian countries, with the exception
38
of Finland where rates of imprisonment declined significantly during the 1990s.
The course of imprisonment rates in Germany sometimes follows the course
of crime rates, but also consistently responds to criminal law reforms that
restrict imprisonment or offer alternatives to imprisonment. The drop in the
number of prisoners in the second half of the 1960s was caused by the
introduction of a rule giving priority to day fines and requiring detailed
39
reasoning when courts resort to short-term prison sentences. The drop
occurring in the 1980s reflects the impact of a criminal law amendment lowering
40
the legal requirements to suspend a prison sentence.
International comparative research on criminal sanctions and sentencing is
still in its infancy. Research so far has dealt with various approaches to explain
increases (and, to a lesser extent, decreases) in prison populations. Increases in
prisoner rates are commonly linked to a growth in the demand for punishment.
Public opinion has been perceived as crucial in understanding the increase in
41
prison populations in some countries. However, it is evident that the course of
Graph 2: Rates of Imprisonment and Crime in Germany 1961 Through 2010.
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38. Tapio Lappi-Seppälä, Reducing the Prison Population: Long-Term Experiences from Finland,
in CRIME POLICY IN EUROPE 139, 148–49 (Council of Europe ed., 2004).
39. STGB, Nov. 13, 1998, BGBL. I at 3322, § 47.
40. 23. STRAFRECHTSÄNDERUNGSGESETZ [CRIMINAL LAW AMENDMENT ACT], Apr. 13, 1986,
BGBL. I at 393.
41. Arie Freiberg & Karen Gelb, Penal Populism, Sentencing Councils and Sentencing Policy, in
PENAL POPULISM, SENTENCING COUNCILS AND SENTENCING POLICY 1, 3 (Arie Freiberg & Karen
Gelb eds., 2008).
42. Sources: Bundeskriminalamt: Polizeiliche Kriminalstatistik 1961–2010. Wiesbaden 1962–2011;
Statistisches Bundesamt: Strafvollzug 1961–2010. Wiesbaden 1962–2011.
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imprisonment and the trends in the size of prison populations do not follow a
common set of variables or conditions. Developments in prison populations are
diverse and reflect—as Tonry and Farrington recently observed—idiosyncrasies
that necessitate careful analysis of individual national systems of sanctions and
43
criminal justice.
Political will as to what role prison sentences should play in a system of
criminal sanctions and how they should be enforced certainly holds a central
place in explanations of the differences in prison populations. A major impact
on the size of prison populations can be expected from deliberate political
decisions to cut down the use of imprisonment. Examples can be drawn from
decisions made by Austrian and German parliaments to reduce the use of short44
term prison sentences (up to six months) in the 1960s. Finland opted also for a
major change in the use of prison sentences when making a decision to adopt
45
practices implemented in other Scandinavian countries. Both examples, the
German–Austrian as well as the Finnish, also demonstrate what is needed to
initiate political discourses and ultimately political changes that reduce the
prison population effectively: a justificatory system or a narrative that is
politically acceptable, that endorses decarceration policies or alternatives to
imprisonment, and that is embraced by the legal professions to whom the
46
implementation of crime policies is entrusted. The narrative drawn from the
47
program of Franz von Liszt was very successful when Germany and Austria
implemented a criminal policy that gave priority to fines and drastically cut
back short prison sentences in the 1960s. In Finland, it was evidently the desire
to fall in line with the rest of the Scandinavian countries that resulted in
adopting a decarceration policy that decreased the prison population
48
significantly.
However, it is not clear how such narratives are put to work effectively and,
in particular, how they achieve insertion into the collective conscience and
value system of the judiciary and other legal professions.
The Finnish case shows that discourses on the role of prison sentences and
the size of the prison population may be initiated by placing national prison
49
figures and sentencing practices into a comparative perspective. In the 1990s in
43. Michael Tonry & David P. Farrington, Punishment and Crime Across Space and Time, in
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN WESTERN COUNTRIES, 1980–1999, at 1 (Michael Tonry & David P.
Farrington eds., 2005).
44. HANS-HEINRICH JESCHECK & GERHARDT GREBING, DIE GELDSTRAFE IM DEUTSCHEN
UND AUSLÄNDISCHEN RECHT 39, 663–664 (1978).
45. Lappi-Seppälä, supra note 37.
46. James B. Jacobs, Finding Alternatives to the Carceral State, 74 SOC. RES. 695 (2007).
47. Franz von Liszt, Der Zweckgedanke im Strafrecht, 3 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR DIE GESAMTE
STRAFRECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 33 (1883) (arguing that imprisonment without long-term rehabilitative
efforts would particularly make first-time offenders worse, and therefore criminal punishment in the
lower scales of seriousness should not exceed a fine).
48. Hanns von Hofer, Tapio Lappi-Seppälä & Lars Westfelt, NORDIC CRIMINAL STATISTICS
1950–2010, at 16 (8th ed. 2012); Lappi-Seppälä, supra note 37.
49. Tapio Lappi-Seppälä, Penal Policy in Scandinavia, 36 CRIME & JUST. 217, 233-44 (2007).
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Australia, the question was raised why New South Wales would experience a
50
much higher prisoner rate than the demographically similar state of Victoria.
The research suggested a mix of causes. In New South Wales, more
imprisonment for fine default, longer prison sentences, and a higher rate of
custodial sentences can be observed; whereas Victoria makes use of an
additional alternative, periodic detention. Such comparisons seem to become
effective within clusters of countries (or political entities) that are, due to
various reasons, close to each other. However, comparisons may also result in
discourses that point towards sentence enhancements and increases in the size
of the prison population. At the occasion of the publication of English prison
figures in 2005, the Chairman of a Northern Irish political party expressed
surprise when he noticed that Northern Ireland had prison population figures of
51
half of those documented for England–Wales. Referring to pressing issues of
violence and security, it was then stated that the public would not understand
that Northern Ireland resorts very rarely to imprisonment.
The questions to be answered now concern, first, how stability in sentencing
outcomes can be demonstrated other than by the rather crude measures of
imprisonment rates, and, second, what explains stability in basic patterns of
sentencing, if stability can be observed.
IV
MEASURES OF STABILITY IN SENTENCING
Stability of sentencing can be observed when looking at the course of the
structure of criminal sanctions. In this respect, Germany displays a remarkably
stable pattern. Between 1970 and 2010, the structure of criminal penalties
evidently did not change at all. In 1970, after a political decision to give priority
to fines, fines accounted for more than 80% of criminal penalties—the same
proportion that can be found in 2010. In between, minor fluctuations reflect
52
“white noise” only.
When considering developments in the second track (measures of
rehabilitation and security), we find a long-term decline in the number of
offenders sentenced to incapacitating preventive detention. This trend was
reversed in the mid-1990s, when dangerous-sexual-offender legislation widened
53
the applicability of preventive detention. This development was stopped by a

50. PATRICIA GALLAGHER, NEW SOUTH WALES BUREAU OF CRIME STATISTICS AND
RESEARCH, WHY DOES NSW HAVE A HIGHER IMPRISONMENT RATE THAN VICTORIA? (1995).
51. Surprise at Prison Population Figures, THE ALLIANCE PARTY OF N. IR. (Sept. 11, 2005),
http://web.archive.org/web/20050926143117/http://www.allianceparty.org/news.asp?id=1576
(internet
archive).
52. WOLFGANG HEINZ, DAS STRAFRECHTLICHE SANKTIONENSYSTEM UND DIE
SANKTIONIERUNGSPRAXIS IN DEUTSCHLAND 1882–2008, at 67 (2010).
53. JÖRG KINZIG, DIE LEGALBEWÄHRUNG GEFÄHRLICHER RÜCKFALLTÄTER: ZUGLEICH EIN
BEITRAG ZUR ENTWICKLUNG DES RECHTS DER SICHERUNGSVERWAHRUNG (2010); Jörg Kinzig, Das
Recht der Sicherungsverwahrung nach dem Urteil des EGMR in Sachen M. gegen Deutschland, 30 NEUE
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR STRAFRECHT 233 (2010).
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series of decisions of the European Court of Human Rights mentioned above
and ultimately by a landmark decision of the German Federal Constitutional
55
Court declaring all second track provisions related to preventive detention
(Sicherungsverwahrung) to be unconstitutional (due to violation of the
principle of proportionality) and fixing a time limit of 2013 for the Federal
Parliament to enact legislation in line with the Basic Law (Grundgesetz,
German Constitution). However, the absolute number of offenders sentenced
to preventive detention and confined after having served a prison sentence was
always relatively small, amounting in the year 2010, for example, to 101 cases
(preventive detainees never comprised more than 1% of the prison population
56
at large). Such small numbers certainly will not affect the structure (and
stability) significantly; the existence of such a group of detainees characterizes a
penal system that exposes a few offenders to extreme (indeterminate and
possibly lifelong) measures of security in exchange for routine sentence
application in the first track of criminal sanctions. As mentioned in the
introduction, Hassemer has interpreted the role of the second track as relieving
the system of criminal penalties and sentencing from pressure to consider
dangerousness and security when imposing criminal punishment. A system of
punishment determined and restricted by personal guilt will be in all societies—
focused on risk and the management of risk—confronted with an enormous
57
pressure to accept risk and the prevention of risk as a salient goal. With a twotrack system, risk management can be channeled to measures of security that
follow a different logic of implementation.
Another way of making stability in sentencing and sentencing outcomes
visible concerns patterns in the length of imprisonment imposed and the course
these patterns take. Four cases will be presented: burglary, aggravated robbery,
rape, and homicide. These offenses were chosen because they represent varying
degrees of policy choices as regards resorting to prison sentences due to
different minimum sentences prescribed by the offense statutes. Although
58
robbery, rape, and homicide offense statutes prescribe minimum penalties,
these statutes also include rules that lower the minimum penalty for “less

54. See supra note 5.
55. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] May 22, 2009, 2
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVerfGE] 2365.
56. STATISTISCHES BUNDESAMT, RECHTSPFLEGE—STRAFVERFOLGUNG 2010, 331 (2011).
57. Hassemer, supra note 7, at 133.
58. The minimum penalty for burglary is three months. STGB, Nov. 13, 1998, BGBL. I at 3322,
§ 243. The minimum penalty for rape is two years (until the end of the 1990s—in 1998, as a result of
expanding the offense statute and including marital rape cases and sexual assault in general, the
minimums were differentiated into one, two, three, and five year categories). Id. § 177. The aggravatedrobbery offense statute prescribed a minimum penalty of five years imprisonment (until the end of the
1990s, then the minimum was split up into three years and five years attached to different sets of
aggravating circumstances). Id. § 250. Murder carries life. Id. § 211. And voluntary homicide carries five
years. Id. § 212. For rape, aggravated robbery, and homicide the minimums are statutorily downgraded
for less-serious offenses (for rape, six months to one year, id. § 177(V), aggravated robbery one year, id.
§ 250(III), and homicide one year, id. § 213).

09_ALBRECHT_BP (DO NOT DELETE)

222

3/19/2013 5:53 PM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 76:211

serious cases” (of rape, robbery or homicide) to penalty ranges that allow for
suspension of a prison sentence. A definition of less serious offenses is not
provided by the law, but is left to the assessment of criminal courts, which on
59
appeal is subject to review by the Federal Court of Justice.
Sentencing of burglary cases results—in the thirty-five year period covered
in Graph 3—in a stable pattern of prison sentences (and day fines). There is
60
evidence that an amendment mentioned above, which lifted particular
restrictions placed on suspending prison sentences between one and two years,
had a significant impact by increasing the rate of suspended prison sentences in
burglary cases immediately from about 40% to approximately 60%. However,
after this significant increase, the rate of suspended prison sentences tends to
become stable again at around 60%. Moreover, the rate of day fines imposed
for burglary offenses (a day fine may replace a prison sentence between three
and six months) between 1976 and 2010 likewise does not reveal particular
trends. The rate does not vary significantly from an average of about 25%
during the period under observation. Most importantly, long prison sentences
(over two years), despite a statutory maximum prison sentence of ten years,
remain consistent and, over a period of thirty-five years, well under 10% of all
sentences imposed for burglary. Although burglary and burglars in the 1960s
Graph 3: Prison Sentence Length and Rates of Suspended Prison Sentences for Burglary, 1976–
61
2010 (%).
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59. See Sönke Gerhold, Der unbenannte minder schwere Fall im Strafrecht und seine Bedeutung für
die Strafzumessung, 2 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR DAS JURISTISCHE STUDIUM 260 (2009).
60. See supra note 39.
61. Sources: Statistisches Bundesamt: Strafverfolgung 1976–2010. Wiesbaden 1977–2011.

09_ALBRECHT_BP (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 1 2013]

3/19/2013 5:53 PM

SENTENCING IN GERMANY

223

were still convenient candidates for the second track and preventive detention
due to the large share of recidivists, and in particular recidivists easily passing
the formal thresholds of preventive detention (prior convictions and prior
prison experience), property offenders moved out of preventive detention since
the 1960s. This trend was initiated by court practice in the 1970s and 1980s and
then acknowledged in recent amendments restricting imposition of preventive
62
detention essentially to violent crimes.
Aggravated robbery carries a minimum prison sentence of five years (since
the end of the 1990s, minimums of three and five years) and a statutory
maximum of fifteen years. However, the offense statute reduces the minimum
penalty to one year if a case of minor seriousness is established.
Graph 4 shows that over a thirty-four year period, consistently around 70–
75% of sentences fall below the statutory minimum of five years (revised in
1998). In the upper half of the regular sentencing range (ten to fifteen years), a
stable trend prevails. Imprisonment of more than five years holds a constant
level between 1976 and 2010. Changes are evidently confined to the area below
the regular minimum penalty and to an exchange of penalties from above five
years to prison sentences of between three and five years. A change, indicating
a move towards imprisonment of between one and two years, is paralleled by an
Graph 4: Prison Sentence Length and Rates of Suspended Prison Sentences for Aggravated
63
Robbery, 1976–2010 (%).
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62. JÖRG KINZIG, DIE LEGALBEWÄHRUNG GEFÄHRLICHER RÜCKFALLTÄTER: ZUGLEICH EIN
BEITRAG ZUR ENTWICKLUNG DES RECHTS DER SICHERUNGSVERWAHRUNG (2010); JÖRG KINZIG,
DIE SICHERUNGSVERWAHRUNG AUF DEM PRÜFSTAND: ERGEBNISSE EINER THEORETISCHEN UND
EMPIRISCHEN BESTANDSAUFNAHME DES ZUSTANDES EINER MAßREGEL (1996).
63. Sources: Statistisches Bundesamt: Strafverfolgung 1976–2010. Wiesbaden 1977–2011.
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increase in suspended prison sentences. In robbery cases, the use of preventive
detention remains stable; preventive detention is added to approximately 0.5%
of aggravated robbery sentences.
The time series accounting for sentences for rape offenses offers an
opportunity not only to look at stability but also at possible effects of a major
64
revision of the rape statute in 1998. This amendment—which went into force in
1998—followed public outrage about sexual murders of children by sexual
65
offenders released on forensic assessments of having a low risk of re-offending.
As indicated above, the minimum penalties were differentiated and raised
66
according to various aggravating circumstances. Moreover, restrictions on the
security measure of preventive detention have been eased. The amendment
went beyond the provision of enhancement of punishment and easing
preventive detention. The amendment responded also to other policy issues,
including marital rape as well as same-gender rape.
When looking at sentencing patterns unfolding between 1995 and 2010 in
rape cases, two trends can be observed: an increase in prison sentences of one
to two years and a parallel increase in the rate of suspended prison sentences.
Graph 5: Prison Sentence Length and Rates of Suspended Prison Sentences for Rape, 1995–2010
67
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64. GESETZ ZUR BEKÄMPFUNG VON SEXUALDELIKTEN UND ANDEREN GEFÄHRLICHEN
STRAFTATEN [LAW ON COMBATING SEXUAL CRIME AND OTHER DANGEROUS CRIMINAL
OFFENSES], Jan. 26, 1998, BGBL. I at 160.
65. Hans-Jörg Albrecht, Die Determinanten der Sexualstrafrechtsreform, 111 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR
DIE GESAMTE STRAFRECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 863 (1999).
66. See supra note 58.
67. Sources: Statistisches Bundesamt: Strafverfolgung 1995–2010. Wiesbaden 1996–2011.
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The increase in the one to two years category slightly affects other categories of
prison sentences.
From police statistics it is known that during the last twenty years, and
evidently influenced by the law reform of 1998, patterns of victim–offender
68
relationships in rape cases known to the police changed. Although the number
of stranger rapes reported to police declined, the number of rapes in close
partnerships increased. From that it may tentatively be concluded that the
changes in the one to two years category and the increase in suspended
sentences reflect a change in the structure of rape cases brought to criminal
courts. It may be assumed that marital rape cases attract more prison sentences
out of the one to two years category, which in turn will also be more likely to be
suspended (an assumption that is plausible on the basis of what is known about
69
the effect of the victim–offender relationship on sentencing). Trends in other
sentence categories display stability. A look at the imposition of preventive
detention during this period reveals a slight increase in absolute numbers
(before 1998 preventive detention is imposed on average in eleven cases per
year; in the period after 1998 some twenty-one cases are counted per year).
Graph 6: Long Prison Sentences and Preventive Detention in Rape Cases.
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68. PKS-Zeitreihen 1987 bis 2011 (Jan. 19, 2013), http://www.bka.de/nn_193232/DE/Publikationen/
PolizeilicheKriminalstatistik/PksZeitreihen/pksZeitreihen__node.html?__nnn=true.
69. HANS-JÖRG ALBRECHT, STRAFZUMESSUNG BEI SCHWERER KRIMINALITÄT; EINE
VERGLEICHENDE THEORETISCHE UND EMPIRISCHE STUDIE ZUR HERTSTELLUNG UND
DARSTELLUNG DES STRAFMASSES (1994) [hereinafter ALBRECHT, STRAFZUMESSUNG BEI
SCHWERER KRIMINALITÄT]; Hans-Jörg Albrecht, Sentencing and Disparity—A Comparative Study, 2
EUR. J. ON CRIM. POL’Y & RES. 98 (1994) [hereinafter Albrecht, Sentencing and Disparity].
70. Sources: Statistisches Bundesamt: Strafverfolgung 1995–2010. Wiesbaden 1996–2011.
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Criminal courts thus have responded to the amendment of 1998 as
71
Hassemer has suggested. Criminal punishment after the reform was imposed
in the same way and with the same results as was done before. The course of
criminal punishment evidently does not reflect security concerns. This is in line
with decisions of the Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof) holding that
incapacitation may not be invoked as grounds in sentencing since the second
track of criminal sanctions provides for exclusive rules regarding security and
72
protection of the public.
The safety valve of preventive detention on the second track was opened
slightly to trap a few more sex offenders, but the punishment track remained
stable—and with that the imposition of prison sentences on the basis of
personal responsibility and guilt.
Stability in sentencing is also visible in murder and homicide cases. Murder
as defined in § 211 of the Criminal Code carries mandatory life imprisonment.
However, decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court and the Federal Court
of Justice—despite the explicit wording of the law—have opened the murder
statute for prison sentences below life (basically with the argument that a
Graph 7: Homicide and Murder Convictions, Life Sentences, and Prisoners Serving Life
73
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71. See Hassemer, supra note 7, at 133.
72. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice], 21 NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR
STRAFRECHT [NStZ] 595, 2001.
73. Sources: Statistisches Bundesamt: Reihe Strafverfolgung 1962–2010. Wiesbaden 1963–2011;
Reihe Strafvollzug 1962–2010. Wiesbaden 1963–2011.
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mandatory criminal penalty does not comply with the need for individualization
74
and the consideration of personal guilt).
In fact, murder convictions during the last fifty years never generated a
corresponding number of life prison sentences. Courts obviously found ways to
circumvent the mandatory penalty long before the Federal Constitutional Court
75
held that a murder conviction need not always result in life imprisonment.
From the conviction and sentencing data as well as data on offenders serving
life sentences, it may be concluded that despite long-term flat lines in murder
convictions and life sentences, the number of prisoners serving life sentences
doubled between the early 1980s and 2010. The only explanation here may be
found in life prisoners serving longer terms and post-sentencing decisions that
delay release from life imprisonment.
A last approach to sentencing stability concerns a look at the reversed Jcurve distribution of sentencing outcomes. The reversed J-curve distribution
comes in two forms and evidently can be traced back to the beginning of the
twentieth century. For the first decades of the twentieth century, Franz Exner
pointed out that criminal sentences were not normally distributed over the
penalty range prescribed in a criminal offense statute but—in those cases for
which data back then were accessible—come in the form of a reversed JGraph 8: Sentencing Fraud—Distribution of Criminal Sentences, 2010.
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74. Tatjana Hörnle, Strafzumessungslehre im Lichte des Grundgesetzes, DAS STRAFENDE GESETZ
(Eva Schumann ed., 2010).
75. See KLAUS SESSAR, RECHTLICHE UND SOZIALE PROZESSE EINER DEFINITION DER
TÖTUNGSKRIMINALITÄT 186–87 (1981) (outlining judicial strategies which avoid the imposition of a
life sentence).
76. Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, Reihe Strafverfolgung 2010. Wiesbaden 2011.
IM SOZIALEN RECHTSSTAAT 105
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distribution, placing the bulk of penalties close to the minimum prescribed by a
77
criminal offense statute.
Sentencing of fraud cases results in an extreme reversed J-distribution. The
fraud offense statute carries a penalty range of a minimum of a day fine and a
maximum of ten years’ imprisonment. Data on display in Graph 8 shows that
sentences above two years are extremely rare and that the bulk of sentences are
concentrated on penalties below six months and on day fines. Virtually all
criminal offenses with a maximum of five years (or lower) and no minimum
display this distribution.
Another type of reversed J-distribution becomes apparent in cases with an
elevated minimum penalty. Here, the distribution charts sentences below the
minimum in cases when courts resort to the reduced sentence made available
through provisions exempting less serious offenses from the mandatory
minimums.
Section 29a I, No. 2 of the Narcotics Law provides for a minimum of oneyear imprisonment and a maximum of the general maximum (fifteen years) for
drug trafficking (including production, trafficking, and possession of significant
78
amounts of controlled drugs). In cases of minor seriousness, the minimum is
reduced to three months. The distribution of sentences approaches a normal
distribution (when considering day fines as the legal minimum). However, the
Graph 9: Distribution of Criminal Sentences for Drug Trafficking (Significant Amounts of
79
Drugs).
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77. FRANZ EXNER, STUDIEN ÜBER DIE STRAFZUMESSUNGSPRAXIS DER DEUTSCHEN GERICHTE
75–85 (1931).
78. GESETZ ÜBER DEN VERKEHR MIT BETÄUBUNGSMITTELN [LAW ON THE MARKETING OF
DRUGS], July 28, 1981, BETÄUBUNGSMITTELGESETZ [BTMG].
79. Source: Statistisches Bundesamt: Reihe Strafverfolgung 2010. Wiesbaden 2011.
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left side of the distribution exhibits exemptions from the regular range of
penalties that start at the one- to two-years category. From this point on, the
reversed J-curve takes effect, demonstrating the concentration of sentences at
the bottom of the penalty range.
Summarizing sentencing patterns for Germany, it can be concluded that
criminal punishment demonstrates significant stability over the last four
decades. The structure of criminal sanctions and measures of sentence length
also exhibit immediate responsiveness to criminal law amendments that
established priority over fines at the end of the 1960s and expanded suspension
of prison sentences in the 1980s. Responsiveness to law reform addressing the
choice between fines, prison sentences, suspended prison sentences, and
immediate imprisonment may be explained by a reversed J-distribution of
criminal sentences that places the bulk of criminal sentences in penalty ranges
that are open to these choices. The provision of less-serious offense statutes
allowing deviation from elevated minimum penalties opens a road back to the
choice between day fines and prison sentences, or suspended and immediate
imprisonment. The question of stability of sentencing therefore moves away
from sentence length and towards the choice between intermediate (or
community) penalties and imprisonment. The second track of sanctions, a
major issue of law reforms aiming at protection of the public in the 1990s and in
the new millennium, does not affect structure and stability of criminal
punishment, but serves evidently as a safety valve that exposes few offenders (a
negligible number in terms of structure and structural impact) assessed to be
dangerous in rather complex and complicated proceedings to indeterminate
confinement. Although a direct test of the “safety valve” hypothesis is not
possible, the time series of criminal punishment and preventive detention
provide for significant empirical support of a theoretically plausible mechanism
exerting restraint on resorting to long prison sentences.
V
WHAT ACCOUNTS FOR STABILITY IN SENTENCING?
Explanations of the course of criminal sentencing on the basis of
comparative approaches have been sought over the last decade in the political
and social framework within which sentencing is implemented and in the
constitutional arrangements that define the relationship between the judiciary,
80
the public, and the political system. Explanations have been sought in
81
differences in the welfare orientation expressed in penal systems. In fact,
retention of welfare policies seems to be correlated with vertical trust (trust in
state institutions), less punitive attitudes of the public, and, ultimately, less use
80. See, e.g., MICHAEL CAVADINO & JAMES DIGNAN, PENAL SYSTEMS: A COMPARATIVE
APPROACH (2006).
81. DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND WELFARE: A HISTORY OF PENAL STRATEGIES (1985);
Lappi-Seppälä, supra note 49.
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of imprisonment and more stable patterns of imprisonment. However, France,
Greece, Belgium, and Spain have political agendas embracing the welfare state
but display punitive patterns in the development of criminal penalties and
prison populations.
Thus, the extent of insulation of the judiciary from the political system has
been proposed as an explanatory factor. Insulation of the judiciary and
protection against political pressures to implement punitive policies may make
transformation of punitive tendencies into sentencing practice more difficult
and sustain stability. In particular, when considering that certain arrangements
83
might be designed to “reflect public emotion” in sentencing, this assumption
certainly has considerable credit when comparing the United States with
continental European countries. But differences in such arrangements do not
explain why judicial systems that are comparably insulated and designed to
separate judicial and political arenas display completely different patterns of
sentencing (and responses to punitive discourses and policies). Germany also
seems to be different in another aspect of the political (and legislative) input
into the system of sentencing. In Germany, there has not been a serious political
attempt at raising minimum sentences in the last five decades without offering
at the same time an escape ramp in the form of a “minor seriousness” category
84
that then reopened the way back to lesser penalty ranges.
Insulation (and stability) might also be achieved through a professionalized
body of judges, and a consolidated and imagined (but convincing) explanation
of sentencing that gets entrenched in the legal profession, in particular in the
judiciary.
In fact, sentencing theory as developed by the judiciary and its essential
elements confirmed in legal doctrine provided for an effective path to
restricting sentencing discretion and creating commitment to sentencing
standards among the judiciary. The judiciary has generated mechanisms that
stabilize sentencing outcomes through a strong attachment to traditional and
established sentencing tariffs. Sentencing research has confirmed that
professional socialization of judges (and public prosecutors) includes learning
patterns that feed almost exclusively on (1) sentencing information passed and
communicated through informal channels (within the judiciary), (2) documents
containing information on past sentences (prior records accessible for
prosecutors and judges before the sentencing decision), and (3) trial
arrangements that provide for sentencing proposals of the public prosecutor

82. Helmut Hirtenlehner & Dina Hummelsheim, Schützt soziale Sicherheit vor
Kriminalitätsfurcht? Eine empirische Untersuchung zum Einfluss wohlfahrtsstaatlicher Sicherungspolitik
auf das kriminalitätsbezogene Sicherheitsbefinden, 94 MONATSSCHRIFT FÜR KRIMINOLOGIE UND
STRAFRECHTSREFORM 178 (2011); Lappi-Seppälä, supra note 49, at 373–377.
83. Tonry, supra note 34, at 1198.
84. Cf. Michael Tonry, Criminology, Mandatory Minimums, and Public Policy, 5 CRIMINOLOGY
& PUB. POL’Y 45, (2006) (describing American experiences with minimum sentences).
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and defense council before the judicial decision is made. In addition, an
effective system of self-control within the judiciary has been developed that
reduces opportunities and incentives to deviate from established sentencing
patterns.
This system is simple but comes with an elaborate sentencing doctrine and
complex reasoning that is based on rather restricted statutory guidance
86
(available in § 46 of the Criminal Code, which emphasizes personal guilt as the
87
decisive basis for sentencing and criminal punishment). However, elaborate
normative reasoning and corresponding sentencing doctrine or theory neither
explain mechanisms of sentencing guidance (or sentencing practices), nor can
they account for stability in sentencing. They just reflect the difference between
presenting (or reasoning about) a sentencing decision and the way a sentencing
decision is made.
Criminal law and doctrine do not provide for guidance and structure beyond
the statement that personal guilt must be the basis of a sentencing decision.
Individual guilt in this respect has two functions: it determines the imputation of
criminal responsibility (rationale of punishment) and it determines the
sentencing decision and the size of the penalty (limitation or restriction of
punishment). The judiciary has developed a model of joining various functions
of criminal punishment:
(1) The limiting function88of guilt does not allow deviation from criminal punishment
commensurate with guilt.
(2) Deterrence and rehabilitative purposes may only be considered within a range of
sentences that is commensurate with individual guilt.

The sentencing theory of “margins” (Spielraumtheorie), as adopted by the
89
German Court of Justice and widely supported by penal scholars, assumes that
a single sentence length exists that corresponds exactly to individual guilt as
90
expressed in the criminal offense. However, it is also assumed that it is not
possible to determine this sentence with precision because of general limitations
in decision-making under conditions of uncertainty and limited access to the
truth. The discourse on this issue is neither theoretically interesting nor of any
value for sentencing practice. The theory of margins simply says that a sentence
corresponding to personal guilt may be chosen from a (narrow) range of
sentences determined within the range of penalties carried by the offense
statute. Minimum and maximum sentences of this narrow range must still be
justified by guilt. Of course, such an assertion is tautological. If it is not possible
85. Albrecht, Sentencing and Disparity, supra note 69.
86. STGB, Nov. 13, 1998, BGBL. I at 3322, § 46.
87. TATJANA HÖRNLE, TATPROPORTIONALE STRAFZUMESSUNG (1999); FRANZ STRENG,
STRAFRECHTLICHE SANKTIONEN: DIE STRAFZUMESSUNG UND IHRE GRUNDLAGEN 215 (2002).
88. BGH Apr. 10, 1987, 34 BGHST 345.
89. BGH Nov. 10, 1954, 7 BGHST 29 (32); BGH Aug. 4, 1965, 20 BGHST 264 (267); BGH Oct.
27, 1970, 24 BGHST 132 (133).
90. BERND-DIETER MEIER, STRAFRECHTLICHE SANKTIONEN 115 (3d ed. 2009); STRENG, supra
note 78, at 252.
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to quantify the criminal penalty that would exactly correspond to personal guilt,
why should it then be possible to quantify the lower and upper borders of a
sentence still commensurate with guilt? Within this assumed range of guiltcommensurate sentences, however, preventive functions of the penalty may be
considered. Sentences falling within the range are considered to be legally
acceptable penalties. The consequence of the theory of margins, therefore, is
not the generation of an effective tool for determining the size of a criminal
penalty, but the theory contributes to opening a normative discourse on which
arguments should influence the limits of a guilt-commensurate criminal penalty.
German doctrine and judicial decisions over the last forty years have generated
an impressive amount of literature and judicial decisions as regards what factors
may be used as aggravating or mitigating circumstances in sentencing decisions,
how the aggravating or mitigating character must be determined, and under
91
what conditions deterrence may influence the penalty. Normative discourses
on sentencing center around the question of the relationship between personal
guilt and positive general prevention, questions of proportionate sentencing and
the range of admissible aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the weight to
be attached to certain circumstances, and how such weight might be expressed.
Likewise impressive is that these discourses—which are, as regards doctrinal
depth and theoretical underpinning, unparalleled in this world—are completely
unrelated to sentencing scales and penalty ranges.
These discourses fail, however, to make a distinction between the
presentation of a sentencing decision and the making of a criminal sentence.
Making the sentence refers to the decision-making process that results in
imposing a concrete criminal penalty. The sentencing decision then has to be
presented in writing and elaborated on all relevant factors that have been
considered in determining the penalty. Presentation and making the sentence
have to be distinguished, particularly in legal systems where the criminal court
is obliged to give detailed reasons in writing for a concrete penalty imposed.
Presentation and making the sentence fulfill different functions.
With respect to making a sentencing decision, most important are those
rules that determine placement of an individual case on the applicable scale (or
range) of penalties. The proposition that the range of penalties carried by an
offense statute represents a scale that reflects seriousness of offenses is not
contended. But the question of how a distribution curve should look has
received only marginal attention. This question is certainly more important than
reasoning about individual sentencing characteristics and how much influence
should be attached to general deterrence within a guilt-commensurate penalty
range (which, in fact, cannot be indicated in concrete cases). With the
elaboration of the concept of the normal or typical case (Regelfall) the German
Federal Court of Justice has presented an answer to that question. A “normal

91. See, e.g., HANS-JÜRGEN BRUNS, STRAFZUMESSUNGSRECHT: GESAMTDARSTELLUNG (1974);
MEIER, supra note 81; STRENG supra note 78.
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case” shall represent the typical perpetration of a criminal offense. With this
approach, a comparative and empirical view is adopted (an approach that poses
the question, “What is typical, and which elements should be considered when
establishing whether an offense falls into the category of a normal or typical
93
criminal offense?”). The typical offense—and this is the decisive point—is
placed within the lower third of the penalty range carried by the respective
offense statute. The Federal Court of Justice assumes (and certainly is correct
when considering mainstream assumptions on how seriousness of crime should
be construed) that the typical criminal offense displays a low degree of
seriousness that does not justify its placement in the middle of the sentencing
94
range. In fact, the distribution of losses in cases of theft, burglary, fraud, or
robbery, and the intensity of injuries in case of violent offenses, as well as other
indicators, all display a concentration at the low end of scales measuring
seriousness of crime. The comparative and empirical approach to the placement
of criminal offenses within the sentencing range is in principle not compatible
with the normative access to discussing guilt and personal responsibility, and
vice versa. Although the latter approach—be it based on individualized
assessments or proportionate thinking—is not capable of identifying a place in
the range of sentences (and it is symptomatic for normative discourses not to
refer to concrete cases or sentencing decisions), the comparative but also
empirical approach is not capable of accounting for the myriad of arguments
coming with individualized sentencing and possible expressions of personal
guilt. This conflict cannot be resolved. It is also interesting to see that while
95
penal doctrine does not seem to be satisfied with this approach, some penal
96
scholars describe it as a matter of fact, but essentially request to individualize
this step, too, although the alternative to the “typical case” standard of the
Federal Court of Justice consists of giving cloudy hints to acts of appraisal,
judicial experience, and judicial skill, which are then labeled as acts of extreme
97
complexity.
However, the German normative framework of sentencing provides an
opportunity to satisfy the obvious need to discuss all factors relevant for
individualized sentencing and to achieve a decision that is carried primarily by
those factors that establish the “typical case” (or establish deviations from it).
Sentencing research dealing with the question of whether a criminal sentence
can be predicted by the arguments used in writing (and justifying the sentencing
decision) has revealed that a (small) part of the grounds introduced in the
92. BGH Sept. 13, 1976, 27 BGHST 2.
93. MATTHIAS MAURER, KOMPARATIVE STRAFZUMESSUNG: EIN BEITRAG ZUR
FORTENTWICKLUNG DES SANKTIONENRECHTS (2005).
94. BGH Jan. 13, 1983, 4 NSTZ 217 (1983); see also BERT GÖTTING, GESETZLICHE
STRAFRAHMEN UND STRAFZUMESSUNGSPRAXIS. EINE EMPIRISCHE UNTERSUCHUNG ANHAND DER
STRAFVERFOLGUNGSSTATISTIK FÜR DIE JAHRE 1987 BIS 1991 (1997).
95. STRENG, supra note 78, at 305.
96. MEIER, supra note 90, at 208.
97. Hörnle, supra note 74, at 116.
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sentencing decision in fact predicts the sentence, as do the same factors that
have been established before the sentencing decision was made (essentially,
losses, prior convictions, and extent of injuries). But most of the reasoning in
sentencing decisions was linked to arguments that did not correlate with the
98
sentencing outcomes. From that, it seems clear that, at least for systems that
require detailed written explanations of sentencing decisions, such written
accounts display a response to normative demands for complex decisions that in
making a decision cannot be met, but in presenting a decision can perfectly be
complied with. The normative discourses around the sentencing decision
triggered in German penal sciences as in jurisprudence of appellate courts
embrace individualization of the penalty as the centerpiece of criminal
punishment theory. The most powerful idea of individualization follows from
post-Enlightenment thinking that each human being should be considered
unique and should be treated according to such uniqueness. Although the idea
of individualization was adopted in sentencing the criminal offender, sentencing
of administrative (or regulatory) offenses evidently was based on another
concept. This concept provides for fixed tariffs—for example, in the case of
99
motor vehicle offenses (speeding, red light violations, et cetera) when
circumstances other than the offense itself are not taken into account. This
system is based on the conviction that in certain situations persons (when
offending) are to be treated solely on the basis of the role they play in these
situations (for example the role of the motor vehicle driver). In the making of a
criminal sentence, the administrative concept of tariffs evidently has been
implemented.
This system of generating at the same time complex legal reasoning and
straightforward practical results (in terms of placing cases regularly at the
bottom of sentencing ranges) is backed by an appellate and review system,
which during the last decades has increasingly treated sentencing as a decision
based on the application of law, rather than discretion. Thus, the German
Federal Court of Justice could identify several areas along the decision-making
process where mistakes in law may occur when deciding on a criminal
100
sentence. First, the court identifies inconsistency in reasoning, which has
obtained the status of a legal mistake, and which is directly related to the
101
demand for complexity in reasoning about a criminal sentence. Second,
flawed assessment of sentencing facts (either mitigating or aggravating) has
102
received the court’s attention, as has, third, deviation from the “usual” penalty

98. ALBRECHT, STRAFZUMESSUNG BEI SCHWERER KRIMINALITÄT, supra note 69, at 408.
99. The Federal Ministry publishes a so-called Bußgeldkatalog [Catalogue of Administrative
Fines], available at http://www.bmvbs.de/SharedDocs/DE/Artikel/StB-LA/bussgeldkatalog.html?nn=
36008#9. This catalogue details tariffs for all administrative offenses. For example, speeding less than
ten kilometers per hour above the limit within city limits incurs a €15 fine.
100. STRENG, supra note 87, at 265.
101. BGH Jan. 9, 1961, 17 BGHST 35.
102. BGH Dec. 7, 1990, 1991, 10 NSTZ 231.
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(or tariff) in sentencing. The latter argument is close to the concept of an error
of law that is based on the finding that a sentence imposed by a trial court is
“completely unjustifiable.” Then, the extent of reasons given in writing for a
criminal sentence must match the seriousness of the sentence. It follows from
this that the closer the sentence is to the maximum penalty allowed by the
104
offense statute, the more detailed the reasons given in writing must be.
Appellate court (and Federal Court of Justice) decisions over recent decades
105
have significantly widened review of sentencing decisions on legal grounds.
Although sentencing once was considered to be fully at the discretion of the
trial judge, today a sentencing decision is considered to be, in its essential parts,
the application of law.
The design of this approach caters to the essential need to generate belief in
the fairness or justice of criminal punishment. Individualization of criminal
punishment may be seen as being just because its consequences result in each
offender being judged on the basis of his or her uniqueness. But
106
individualization is not compatible with the maxim “treat like cases alike”
because like cases are difficult to imagine if each offender (and the related
criminal offense) is unique.
The German system of sentencing therefore is designed not to respond to
external influences but to increase incentives to stay in line with past sentencing
decisions and resulting patterns, and to drastically reduce opportunities to
deviate from established sentencing patterns.
VI
CONCLUSION
The German system of sentencing is based on a deeply entrenched
mechanism of learning and transmitting established sentencing patterns. This
mechanism performs the same functions as sentencing guidelines or sentencing
councils, but is more effective in sustaining stable and predictable sentencing
patterns through
(1) self-control and commitment generated within the judiciary itself, and
(2) a comparative and empirical approach to assessing cases that separates making a
sentencing decision from reasoning about a sentencing decision.

Both levels are important, though. The comparative and empirical approach
allows for learning, professional socialization, and the formation of collective
knowledge about where to place “typical cases.” The level of normative
reasoning and development of legal doctrine on sentencing serve to satisfy the
demand for individualized sentencing and—due to elaborated statutory duties

103.
104.
105.
106.

BGH Feb 27, 1992, 1992, 12 NSTZ 381.
BGH October 22, 2002, 2003, 8 NSTZ-RR 52.
RAINER HAMM, DIE REVISION IN STRAFSACHEN 543 (7th ed. 2010).
MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 186 (1996).
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to justify sentencing in writing—as a permanently available reservoir of
mistakes in law that allow for interventions by appellate courts.
The normative framework supports this system of self-control by providing
a second track of measures of security that facilitate commitments to guilt and
relieve the first track of pressures to consider risk and security that would not
be compatible with learning routines, values, and sentencing discourses
developed and transmitted in the judicial system.

